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Newly discovered business case for Canadian energy could unleash economic boom

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From Resource Works

Canada has a hefty slate in recent years of big natural-resource projects that were abandoned, or put on a back burner, often because of government action or inaction.

One estimate is that Canada has seen $670 billion in cancelled resource projects since 2015, when Justin Trudeau became prime minister.

True, the Trudeau government in 2018 backed and took over the Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project, known as TMX. That’s been a success since May 2024, moving oil to U.S. and Asian buyers. It’s looking now to move more oil to Asia. And Ottawa is talking of First Nations getting some equity interest in it.

Many other major projects have been shelved or scrapped, though, some due to corporate economic decisions, but many due to governments.

One prime example was the Énergie Saguenay LNG project in Quebec. That $20-billion plan was fatally throttled in 2022 — on green grounds — by Quebec’s government and Trudeau’s minister of environment and climate change, Steven Guilbeault.

Now, with Trudeau leaving and a potential change federal government possible, there’s some early talk of reviving some projects. For example, Nova Scotia Premier Tim Houston has urged Ottawa to “immediately” revive the Energy East oil pipeline project.

And U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats of tariffs on imports from Canada have underlined calls for new energy exports to new overseas customers.

We list below 31 projects that have been abandoned or shelved, or have not been heard from for years. They are listed in order of the year of cancellation, or the year they were last heard from.

Keltic LNG

This project was actually an LNG import facility that would then manufacture plastic pellets.  It  won its first government approval (from Nova Scotia) in 2007. But it never went ahead, and all approvals long ago expired.

Corridor Resources shale gas

Proposed in 2011, the idea was to produce from the huge shale-gas reserves in New Brunswick. But Corridor Resources (now called Headwater Exploration Inc)  was unable to find a partner. And in 2014 the N.B. government put a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) for gas; it is still in effect.

Dunkirk oil sands 

Proposed by the billionaire Koch brothers of the U.S. in 2014, but ditched later that year, this Alberta project was supposed to produce up to 60,000 barrels a day, using the in-situ steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) process.

Kitsault LNG

Kitsault Energy proposed in 2013 an LNG-for-export project at the northern mining ghost town of Kitsault BC. It hoped to line up a pipeline partner, create an ‘energy corridor’, and to begin production in 2018. It said it was still working on cost estimates in 2014, and nothing was heard thereafter.

Carmon Creek oil sands

Shell proposed this in 2013, to produce 80,000 barrels a day. The company in 2014 said it would slow down the project while attempting to lower costs and improve its design. But in 2015, Shell gave up on it, giving a lack of pipelines to coastal waters as one reason.

Stewart LNG

The Canada Stewart Energy Group proposed in 2014 an LNG terminal near Stewart in northern BC. It aimed to produce 30 million tonnes a year, starting in 2017. It has not been heard from since 2014.

Watson Island LNG

This LNG terminal was proposed in 2014 by Watson Island LNG Corporation, to be located at Prince Rupert, with capacity to produce one million tonnes of LNG a year. There have been no updates since 2014, and the project’s website is no longer online.

Discovery LNG

Rockyview Resources was the developer of this LNG project at Campbell River on Vancouver Island, first proposed in 2014. It was a big plan, for 20 million tonnes of LNG a year, and would need a 300-km pipeline from the mainland. As of January 2018, Rockyview was reported still seeking partners, but there have been no updates since 2015.

Orca LNG

A Texas-based company got from Canada’s National Energy Board in 2015 a license to export 24 million tonnes of LNG a year, from a proposed plant at or near Prince Rupert. There has been no news from the developer since then.

New Times Energy LNG

New Times Energy proposed in 2015 to locate at Prince Rupert an LNG terminal capable of producing 12 million tonnes of LNG a year. Ottawa approved its export licence in 2016, but there has been no news of the project, or of any pipeline to feed it, since then.

Northern Gateway 

Journalist Tom Fletcher recently looked in Northern Beat at the idea of reviving the $7.9-billion Northern Gateway pipeline, first proposed in 2008 and shelved in 2016.

“One new project that could be reactivated is the Northern Gateway oil pipeline, snuffed out by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s environmental posturing.

“Already burdened by court challenges, Enbridge’s Northern Gateway was killed by Trudeau’s 2016 declaration that oil tankers shouldn’t be allowed near the ‘Great Bear Rainforest.’

“He is among many urban people who are unaware this faux-Indigenous name was dreamed up by professional environmentalists at a fancy restaurant in San Francisco, explicitly to create a barrier for Canadian oil exports to Asia. . . ..

“Those Asia exports have finally begun to flow in significant volumes through the recent Trans Mountain pipeline expansion, which has been mostly at capacity since it opened.”

Fletcher notes that in 2021 then-Conservative leader Erin O’Toole campaigned on a promise to revive the Northern Gateway pipeline.

“Whether a new federal government can or wants to revive Northern Gateway is unknown. But combined with Coastal Gaslink, it would build on a northern resource corridor that could also include the already-permitted Prince Rupert Gas Transmission line now proposed by TC Energy and the Nisga’a government.

“The Prince Rupert line would supply a floating LNG plant (the Nisga’a Nation’s Ksi Lisims LNG project) and new power lines along the energy corridor could help serve the needs of the broad expanse of northern B.C. that remains off the grid.”

Muskwa oil sands

Another project of the Koch brothers in Alberta’s oil sands, proposed in 2012, this project was to produce 10,000 barrels per day. It was scrapped in 2016, with the developer citing “regulatory uncertainty.”

Douglas Channel LNG

This modest (0.55 million tonnes a year) floating LNG project was led by Alta Gas. The plan was for a $400-million floating terminal in Douglas Channel near Kitimat. It was shelved in 2016, with Alta Gas citing a global surplus in LNG, and low prices.

Triton LNG

At the same time as scrapping Douglas Channel LNG (above), Alta Gas and partner Idemitsu Kosan of Japan put a freeze on the Triton LNG project in the same area. It was proposed in 2013, and was to have produced up to 2.3 million tonnes of LNG per year.

Energy East 

Another classic and costly example of shelving was the $15.7-billion Energy East pipeline. This was proposed in 2013, the aim being to switch 3,000 km of the TransCanada gas pipeline to carry oil, and add another 1,500 km of oil pipeline and facilities. All this so it could move oil from Alberta and Saskatchewan to Quebec and New Brunswick refineries, for domestic use and for exports.

The project was strenuously attacked by environmental groups (and a number of First Nations) and a poll showed nearly 60% of Quebecers opposed it. Quebec politicians called for more stringent environmental rules to apply to it, and the Quebec government decided on a court challenge, to ensure the Quebec portion of the project met that province’s environmental laws and regulations.

Trans Canada (now TC Energy) then shelved the project in October 2017, citing “existing and likely future delays resulting from the regulatory process, the associated cost implications and the increasingly challenging issues and obstacles.” The project had already cost Trans Canada $1 billion.

(The same day, Trans Canada also scrapped its Eastern Mainline project, to add new gas pipeline and compression facilities to the existing system in Southern Ontario.)

New Brunswick Premier Blaine Higgs soon sought to revive Energy East, and discussed it with Trudeau. He quoted Trudeau as saying he’d be willing to discuss the issue again if Higgs was able to get Quebec onside. But Trans Canada repeated its announced decision.

Now, with Trump threatening tariffs, Nova Scotia Premier Tim Houston is calling on Ottawa to approve the Energy East oil pipeline. He said Trump’s tariffs mean here is “urgency” to strengthen the country through projects such as Energy East.

Earlier, commentator Brian Zinchuk of Pipeline Online urged: “If (Conservative leader Pierre) Poilievre wins a massive majority, can we PLEASE build the Energy East Pipeline?

Zinchuk added: “So what could a newly empowered government with a massive majority do? Here’s a novel idea: Call up TC Energy and ask them to dust off their 2014 application to build the Energy East Pipeline. We’re going to need it.”

Mackenzie Valley Pipeline

This project was first proposed in the early 1970s to move natural gas from the Beaufort Sea to northern Alberta, and then to tie in to existing gas pipelines there.

Ottawa launched in 1974 a federal inquiry into the project. After three years (and at a cost of $5.3-million) inquiry commissioner Thomas Berger said in 1977 that the 1,220-km pipeline should be postponed for 10 years, estimating that it would take that long for land claims to be settled and for Indigenous Peoples to be ready for the impact of such a project.

Eventually, after another six years of review, the Mackenzie Valley pipeline was granted federal approval in 2011, subject to 264 conditions.

But by 2017 the initially estimated costs of $8 billion had risen to $16.2 billion, and the joint-venture partnership of Imperial Oil, ConocoPhillips Canada, ExxonMobil Canada and the Aboriginal Pipeline Group announced abandonment of the project, citing natural gas prices – but also the long regulatory process.

Said an Imperial Oil official: “Our initial estimate for the timing for the regulatory process was somewhere between 22 and 24 months. We filed for regulatory approval in October 2004 and we received final regulatory approval in 2011. I’ll leave it up to you to decide if that is a reasonable amount of time for a significant capital investment project.”

Prince Rupert LNG

Shell Canada took over in 2016 the BG Group’s back-burnered 2012 proposal for an $11-billion LNG terminal on Ridley Island, Prince Rupert. It was to produce 21 million tonnes of LNG per year. But in 2017, Shell shelved the project.

That also killed the $9.6-billion Westcoast Connector pipeline proposed by Enbridge in 2012. This was to build an 850-km natural gas pipeline corridor from northeast B.C. to Ridley Island to feed gas to Prince Rupert LNG.

There followed recently some thought that this Westcoast Connector pipeline could be revived, to feed the Nisga’a Nation’s proposed Ksi Lisims LNG project, but Ksi Lisims chose to take over the Prince Rupert Gas Transmission pipeline (PRGT).

Pacific Northwest LNG

Pacific NorthWest LNG proposed in 2013 a $36-billion LNG-for-export plant on Lelu Island south of Prince Rupert BC.

It was to produce up to 20.5 million tonnes of LNG a year, and would include a marine terminal for loading LNG on to vessels for export to markets in Asia.

As ever, the proposal ran into opposition from environmental and some (but not all) Indigenous groups. And in 2017, Malaysia’s Petronas and its minority partners (China’s Sinopec, Japan’s JAPEX, Indian Oil Corporation and PetroleumBrunei) decided not to proceed.

They cited “changes in market conditions.” But CEO Mike Rose of Tourmaline Oil, Canada’s largest natural-gas producer, pointed a finger at governments, saying “government dithering” played a role in the cancellation.

“They [Petronas] kept getting held up. . . .  All levels of government were trying to squeeze more money out of them.”

Rose said a “more effective, streamlined approval process,” would have seen Petronas make a final investment decision on the project three years earlier, when LNG prices were much higher.

(Petronas continues to be a 25% partner in the LNG Canada project, which goes online later this year.)

The Pacific NorthWest LNG plant would have been fed by TC Energy’s 900-km Prince Rupert Gas Transmission pipeline (PRGT). The permits for that line now are owned by the Nisg̱a’a First Nation and partner Western LNG. They propose a route change so the line can feed the Nation’s planned Ksi Lisims LNG plant. The B.C. Environmental Assessment Office now is considering whether the pipeline’s permits are still valid.

Aurora LNG 

Nexen Energy, with Chinese and Japanese partners, proposed in 2014 the $28-billion Aurora LNG terminal on Digby Island, Prince Rupert. It would have produced up to 24 million tonnes of LNG a year. The partners ditched the plan in 2017, citing the economics.

WCC LNG

Exxon Mobil and Calgary-based Imperial Oil proposed in 2015 this $25-billion LNG export facility on Tuck Inlet, Prince Rupert. It was to produce some 30 million tonnes per year. The partners scrapped the project in 2018, without explanation.

Grassy Point LNG 

Australia’s Woodside Energy proposed in 2014 a $10-billion facility 30 km north of Prince Rupert, to produce up to 20 million tonnes of LNG per year. Woodside shelved the plan in 2018. It said it would focus instead on the Kitimat LNG project with Chevron Canada (but that also died on the drawing board.  (See ‘Kitimat LNG’ farther below)

Aspen oil sands 

An Imperial Oil project, proposed in 2013, was to produce up to 150,000 barrels of bitumen a day. The $7-billion project was put on hold in 2019.

Kwispaa LNG

Proposed in 2014, this was an $18-billion project for an LNG plant near Bamfield on Vancouver Island, with an associated natural-gas pipeline. It was to be developed by Steelhead LNG Corporation through a co-management partnership with the Huu-ay-aht First Nations. The plan was to produce 12 million tonnes a year, and later up to 24 million. Steelhead stopped work on it in 2019, and in 2022 Ottawa formally terminated the environmental-assessment window for the project.

Frontier Oil Sands 

Teck proposed this $20.6-billion mining project in Alberta’s oil sands in 2012, but gave up the idea in 2020. It would have had production capacity of about 260,000 barrels a day.

Kitimat LNG

Kitimat LNG was a $30-billion LNG-for-export plant at Kitimat BC, proposed in 2018 by Chevron Canada and Australia’s Woodside Energy. It was designed to produce up to 10 million tonnes of LNG a year.

Chevron sought to sell its share of the project but failed to find a buyer, and in the end Chevron and Woodside shelved the project in 2021.

Kitimat LNG would have been fed gas bv the proposed Pacific Trails Pipeline, a project by Chevron and Apache Corporation. Woodside Australia had bought Apache’s stake in the project for $2.75 billion in 2014. The pipeline plan has also been put away.

Goldboro LNG

Alberta energy company Pieridae proposed in 2011 an LNG plant on Nova Scotia’s east shore. The plan was to ship 10 million tonnes per year to Europe. But the project failed to win $925 million in federal funding, and Pieridae bailed out in 2021

Keystone XL 

The $8-billion Keystone XL pipeline was proposed in 2008 by TC Energy, to deliver Alberta oil to Nebraska, and then, through existing pipelines, to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast.

The project got its key U.S. presidential permit from then-president Donald Trump in 2017. Work eventually began in 2020, with the Alberta government kicking in $1.5 billion, and a promise of a $6-billion loan guarantee, in hopes of completion in 2023.

But under pressure from environmental groups, U.S. president Joe Biden revoked the permit on his first day in office on January 20, 2021, citing the “climate crisis.”

So this was, then, a rare Canadian project cancellation engineered by the U.S., not by Canada.

Énergie Saguenay

In 2015 came GNL Québec’s $20-billion proposal to build an LNG plant at the port of Saguenay in Quebec.

The Énergie Saguenay project, backed by Ruby Capital of the U.S., would connect to TC Energy’s Canadian Mainline, the big natural gas pipeline that carries gas from Western Canada to markets in Canada and the United States. The connection would be via a 780-km pipeline from northeastern Ontario to Saguenay, proposed by Gazoduq Inc.

Énergie Saguenay said its plant would produce 10.5 million tonnes of LNG a year. (The LNG Canada plant in B.C. will produce up to 14 million tonnes a year.) Énergie Saguenay said it would export its LNG via the St. Lawrence and Saguenay Rivers. It spoke of 140-165 shipments per year

The project raised considerable interest, as Germany, Latvia and Ukraine were expressing interest in importing Canadian LNG. Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz came to Canada in the summer of 2022 and asked Trudeau about LNG exports.

Trudeau, though, said he saw no business case for LNG exports to Europe, and said Canada could always send natural gas to the U.S., where Americans could turn it into American LNG and send that to Europe. (This was already happening, and continues.)

In the end, the Quebec government, which initially supported Énergie Saguenay, changed its mind and pulled the plug on environmental grounds.

Then Steven Guilbeault, federal minister of environment and climate change, hammered home the final coffin nail in 2022, saying: “The Énergie Saguenay Project underwent a rigorous review that clearly demonstrates that the negative effects the project would have on the environment are in no way justifiable.”

That regulatory rejection has led to a $20.12-billion international damage claim against the federal government by Ruby Capital.

Bear Head LNG

Bear Head Energy planned in 2014 to build an LNG-for-export plant on the Strait of Canso, Nova Scotia.  It was to send 12 million tonnes a year to Europe. But in 2023 Bear Head, under new ownership, announced plans instead to produce hydrogen for export.

Port Edward LNG

Planning started in 2019 for this $450-million small-scale LNG project, for a site east of Port Edward BC. It was to ship LNG overseas in containers, but the project was scrapped in 2024.

Enbridge Line 5

Under appeal is a U.S. court order to shut down, by 2026, this pipeline that carries Canadian oil to Ontario, by way of Wisconsin and Michigan. In the court case, the  Wisconsin-based Bad River Band, through whose territory the pipeline runs, seeks to have it shut down.

A U.S. district court ordered Enbridge in 2023 to shut down parts of the pipeline within three years and pay the band $5.2 million for trespassing on its land. Enbridge is appealing (and so is the Bad River Band, which wants an immediate shutdown.)

What’s next?

While there has been a little chatter about reviving some of the scratched projects, there have been no formal proposals for resurrections, and Canada’s current attention is on Donald Trump and his promised tariffs in imports from Canada

On the political front in Canada, national Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre said in a recent speech in Vancouver: “By blocking pipelines and LNG plants in Canada, the Liberals have forced Canadians to sell almost all of our energy to the United States, giving President Trump massive leverage in making these tariff threats.”.

He said that that if he was prime minister, he would have approved pipelines such as Northern Gateway and Energy East, as well as giving fast-track approvals for LNG plants, thus giving Canada more export options.

And Poilievre promised to allow pipeline companies on First Nations lands to pay some of their federal tax to affected nations.

“Then these communities will have a very powerful incentive to say yes, and they can use some of that money to defeat poverty, build schools and hospitals and clean water and other essentials for their people.”

But now Canada has first to cope with Trump’s Fortress America economic-warfare plans.

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Long Ignored Criminal Infiltration of Canadian Ports Lead Straight to Trump Tariffs

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Sam Cooper

Briefings to Liberal Government on Chinese Infiltration of Vancouver Port and Canada’s Opioid Scourge Ignored

Trump Tariffs Loom as Critics Decry Ottawa’s “Fox in the Hen House” Approach to Border Security

As President Donald Trump readies sweeping tariffs against Canada on Saturday—citing Ottawa’s failure to secure its shared North American borders from fentanyl originating in China—The Bureau has obtained a remarkable December 1999 document from a senior law enforcement official, revealing Ottawa’s longstanding negligence in securing Vancouver’s port against drug trafficking linked to Chinese shipping entities.

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The letter, drafted by former Crown prosecutor Scott Newark and addressed to Ottawa’s Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), urged the body to reconsider explosive findings from a leaked RCMP and CSIS report detailing the infiltration of Canada’s “porous” borders by Chinese criminal networks.

Titled “Re: S.I.R.C. Review in relation to Project Sidewinder,” Newark’s letter alleges systemic failures that enabled Chinese State Council owned shipping giant COSCO and Triads with suspected Chinese military ties to penetrate Vancouver’s port system. He further asserts that federal authorities ignored repeated briefings and warnings from Canadian law enforcement—warnings based on intelligence gathered by Canadian officials in Hong Kong, who initiated the Sidewinder review.

Newark also warned that Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s decision to dismantle Canada’s specialized Ports Police and privatize national port control had left the country dangerously exposed to foreign criminal networks, noting he had personally briefed the Canadian government on these concerns as early as 1996.

Addressing his letter to SIRC’s chair, Quebec lawyer Paule Gauthier, Newark wrote:

“As the former (1994-98) Executive Officer of the Canadian Police Association, I was assigned responsibility for dealing with the issue of the federal government’s changes to control of the national ports and policing therein.”

“This involved close examination of matters such as drug, weapon, and people smuggling through the national ports and, in particular, both the growing presence of organized criminal groups at ports and the ominous hazard control of those ports by such groups represented.”

Newark’s letter goes on to allege widespread failures in Ottawa that facilitated Chinese Triad infiltration of Vancouver’s port, revealing federal authorities’ reluctance to act on warnings from RCMP officer Garry Clement and immigration control officer Brian McAdam—former Canadian officials based in Hong Kong who had sounded the alarm, prompting the Sidewinder review.

Newark explained to SIRC’s chair that, during his tenure as Executive Officer of the Canadian Police Association, he prepared approximately fifty detailed policy briefs for the government and regularly appeared before parliamentary committees and in private ministerial briefings.

“I can assure you that in all of that time, no clearer warning was ever given by Canada’s rank and file police officers to the national government than what was done in our unsuccessful attempt to prevent the disbandment of the specialized Canada Ports Police in combination with the privatization of the ports themselves,” Newark’s letter to SIRC states.

The letter continues, noting that in October 1996, Newark met with Chrétien’s Transport Minister David Anderson—later addressing the Transport Committee—to highlight the imminent threat posed by Asian organized crime’s infiltration of port operations. Newark’s written briefing to the Minister underscored the gravity of the situation with a blunt question:

“Who exactly are the commercial port operators?”

Citing the Anderson briefing document, Newark’s letter to SIRC states that Anderson had been warned:

“We are, for example, aware of serious concerns amongst the international law enforcement community surrounding the ownership of ports and container industries in Asia and, in particular, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China. There is simply no longer any doubt that drugs like heroin are coming from these destinations through the Port of Vancouver, moved by organized criminal gangs whose assets include ‘legitimate’ properties.”

The Anderson briefing also referenced a British Columbia anti-gang unit report, titled “Organized Crime on Vancouver Waterfront,” which made clear that the Longshoreman’s Union had been infiltrated by the Hells Angels.

“The movement of goods through Canada’s ports requires an independence in policing that is impossible without public control,” the report warned.

It concluded:

“This report should be taken as a specific warning to this Government that, prior to downloading operational control over the ports themselves to private interests, Government be absolutely certain as to who owns what—and that it can continue that certainty with power to refuse acquisition of port assets in the future.”

Scott Newark’s letter to SIRC then turns to new intelligence—gathered from Canadian and U.S. officials—that further underscored the vulnerability created by Chrétien’s border policies.

“To now learn that law enforcement and public officials in Canada and the United States have linked a company (COSCO), granted docking and other facilities in Vancouver, to Asian organized crime, arms and drug smuggling is, to say the least, disturbing,” Newark’s December 1999 letter states.

“That this company, its principals, subsidiaries, and partners have been associated with various military agencies of a foreign government—agencies themselves identified by Canadian and American officials as having unhealthy connections to Triad groups—makes a bad situation even worse.”

Newark next addressed the broader implications of Canada’s failure to enforce border security, particularly in relation to the deportation of foreign criminals—a process he had sought to reform while serving with the Canadian Police Association.

Drawing on his experience, he described a deeply flawed immigration enforcement system, one that allowed individuals with serious criminal records to remain in Canada indefinitely. The problem, he wrote, was twofold: not only were foreign criminals able to enter Canada with ease, but authorities also failed to deport those with outstanding arrest warrants.

Newark recounted how, in 1996, a Cabinet Minister requested that he meet with Brian McAdam, a former senior foreign service officer in Hong Kong who had spent years uncovering organized crime’s grip on Canada’s immigration system. McAdam’s detailed revelations, he wrote, had directly led to the launch of Project Sidewinder.

Newark told SIRC that even after leaving the Canadian Police Association in 1998, he remained in contact with McAdam and other officials working to expose this vast and complex national security risk posed by foreign criminal networks.

It was this ongoing communication that led to an even more alarming discovery. Newark wrote that he was stunned to learn that Canada’s government had not only terminated Project Sidewinder but had gone so far as to destroy some related files.

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Newark suggests SIRC’s chair, in her review of Sidewinder, should determine whether “Sidewinder should not have been cancelled … why such inappropriate action was taken and at whose direction this was done.”

He concludes that SIRC should also freshly examine why intelligence reporting from the Canadian officials in Hong Kong, Brian McAdam and Garry Clement had been ignored in Ottawa.

Newark’s letter to SIRC says these failures to act on intelligence included the “Inappropriate granting of visas to Triad members or associates” and “Granting of docking facilities with attendant consequences to COSCO”—and “Failure of CIC and Foreign Affairs to respond appropriately to the various information supplied by McAdam and Clement in relation to material pertaining to Sidewinder.”

In an exclusive interview with The Bureau, Garry Clement, who contributed to investigations referenced in Newark’s letter, corroborated many of its claims and provided further insight. Clement recalled his role in Project Sunset, a 1990s investigation into Chinese Triads’ efforts to gain control over Vancouver’s ports.

“I can remember having a discussion with Scott when he wrote that to SIRC because Scott and I go back a long time,” Clement said. “I knew about him writing on it, but I knew it was also buried.”

He described his own intelligence work during the same period:

“I wrote in the nineties when I was the liaison officer in Hong Kong, a very long intelligence brief on the Chinese wanting to basically acquire or build out a port at the Surrey Fraser Docks area. And it was going to be completely controlled by that time, with Triad influence, but it was going to be controlled by China.”

Clement expressed frustration that decades of warnings had gone unheeded:

“The bottom line is that here we are almost 40 years later, talking about an issue that was identified in the ‘90s about our ports and allowing China to have free access—and nothing has been done over that period of time.”

Newark’s urgent recommendation for SIRC to reconsider Sidewinder’s warnings on Vancouver’s ports was never acted upon.

“We still don’t have Port Police. We got nobody overseeing them,” Clement added. “The ports themselves, it’s sort of like putting a fox in the hen house and saying, ‘Behave yourself.’”

Finally, when asked about the Trudeau government’s claim this week that Canada is responsible for only one percent of the fentanyl entering the United States—a figure reported widely in Canadian media—Clement’s response was unequivocal.

“The fact that we’ve become a haven for transnational organized crime, it’s internationally known,” he said. “So when I read that, with the fentanyl—Trump is wrong in that there’s less than 1% of our fentanyl going to the United States. That’s a crock of shit. If you look at the two super labs that were taken down in British Columbia—I think there’s three now—the amount they were capable of producing was more than the whole Vancouver population could have used in 10 years. So we know that Vancouver has become a transshipment point to North America for opiates and cocaine and other drugs because it’s a weak link, and enforcement is not capable of keeping up with transnational organized crime.”

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That opinion is evidently acknowledged by British Columbia Premier David Eby, according to documents from Canada’s Foreign Interference Commission that say Eby sought meetings with Justin Trudeau’s National Security Advisor.

A record from the Hogue Commission, sanitized for public release, outlines the “context and drivers” behind Eby’s concerns, including “foreign interference; election security; countering fentanyl, organized crime, money laundering, corruption.”

The documents state Ottawa’s Privy Council Office—which provides advice to Justin Trudeau’s cabinet—had recommended that British Columbia continue to work with the federal government on initiatives like the establishment of a new Canada Financial Crimes Agency to bolster the nation’s ability to respond swiftly to complex financial crimes.

Additionally, the PCO highlighted that Canada, the United States, and Mexico were supposedly collaborating on strategies to reduce the supply of fentanyl, including addressing precursor chemicals and preventing the exploitation of commercial shipping channels—a critical area where British Columbia, and specifically the Port of Vancouver, plays a significant role.

Eby acknowledged the concerns again this week in an interview with Macleans.

“I understood Trump’s concerns about drugs coming in. We’ve got a serious fentanyl problem in B.C.; we see the precursor chemicals coming into B.C. from China and Mexico. We see ties to Asian and Mexican organized crime groups. We’d been discussing all of that with the American ambassador and fellow governors. That’s why it was such a strange turnaround, from ‘Hey, we’re working together on this!’ to suddenly finding ourselves in the crosshairs.”

Yet, despite Eby’s claims of intergovernmental efforts, critics—including Garry Clement—argue that nothing has changed. Vancouver’s port remains alarmingly vulnerable, a decades-old concern that continues to resurface as fentanyl and other illicit drugs flood North American markets.

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Ottawa’s “Net Zero” emission-reduction plan will cost Canadian workers $8,000 annually by 2050

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From the Fraser Institute

Ross McKitrick.jpg

Ross McKitrick

Professor of Economics, University of Guelph

Canada’s Path to Net Zero by 2050: Darkness at the End of the Tunnel

The federal government’s plan to achieve “net zero” greenhouse gas emissions will result in 254,000 fewer jobs and cost workers $8,000 in lower wages by 2050, all while failing to meet the government’s own emission-reduction target, finds a new study published today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, nonpartisan Canadian public policy think-tank.

“Ottawa’s emission-reduction plan will significantly hurt Canada’s economy and cost workers money and jobs, but it won’t achieve the target they’ve set because it is infeasible,” said Ross McKitrick, senior fellow at the Fraser Institute and author of Canada’s Path to Net Zero by 2050: Darkness at the End of the Tunnel.

The government’s Net Zero by 2050 emission-reduction plan includes: the federal carbon tax, clean fuel standards, and various other GHG-related regulations, such as energy efficiency requirements for buildings, fertilizer restrictions on farms, and electric vehicle mandates.

By 2050, these policies will have imposed significant costs on the Canadian economy and on workers.

For example:

• Canada’s economy will be 6.2 per cent smaller in 2050 than it would have been without these policies.
• Workers will make $8,000 less annually.
• And there will be 254,000 fewer jobs.

The study also shows that even a carbon tax of $1,200 per tonne (about $2.70 per litre of gas) would not get emissions to zero. Crucially, the study finds that the economically harmful policies can’t achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 and will only reduce GHG emissions by an estimated 70 per cent of the government’s target.

“Despite political rhetoric, Ottawa’s emission-reduction policies will impose enormous costs without even meeting the government’s target,” McKitrick said.

“Especially as the US moves aggressively to unleash its energy sector, Canadian policymakers need to rethink the damage these policies will inflict on Canadians and change course.”

  • The Government of Canada has committed to going beyond the Paris target of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 40 percent below 2005 levels as of 2030 and now intends to achieve net zero carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions as of 2050. This study provides an outlook through 2050 of Canada’s path to net zero by answering two questions: will the Government of Canada’s current Emission Reduction Plan (ERP) get us to net zero by 2050, and if not, is it feasible for any policy to get us there?
  • First, a simulation of the ERP extended to 2050 results in emissions falling by approximately 70 percent relative to where they would be otherwise, but still falling short of net zero. Moreover, the economic costs are significant: real GDP declines by seven percent, income per worker drops by six percent, 250,000 jobs are lost, and the annual cost per worker exceeds $8,000.
  • Second, the study explores whether a sharply rising carbon tax alone could achieve net zero. At $400 per tonne, emissions decrease by 68 percent, but tripling the carbon tax to $1,200 per tonne achieves only an additional 6 percent reduction. At this level, the economic impacts are severe: GDP would shrink by 18 percent, and incomes per worker would fall by 17 percent, compared with the baseline scenario.
  • The conclusion is clear: Without transformative abatement technologies, Canada is unlikely to reach net zero by 2050. Even the most efficient policies impose unsustainable costs, making them unlikely to gain public support.

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Ross McKitrick

Professor of Economics, University of Guelph
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