While Beijing boosts Mark Carney on WeChat, federal officials downplay foreign interference, dodge accountability, and protect the very narrative propped up by the CCP.

As Canadians prepare to head to the polls on April 28, 2025, the federal government is working overtime to project an image of preparedness in the face of growing foreign interference, digital disinformation, and mounting public skepticism.

This week’s National Election Security Briefing—one in a series leading up to the vote—was framed as a gesture of transparency and reassurance. Led by Lauren Kempton, the session brought together senior bureaucrats from Canada’s intelligence, cybersecurity, and diplomatic corps. Among them: Allan Sutherland from the Privy Council Office, Vanessa Lloyd of the SITE Task Force, Bridget Walsh from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, and Larissa Galarza from Global Affairs.

They were joined virtually by officials from the RCMP, CSIS, and other federal agencies, forming what was presented as a united front against threats to Canada’s democratic process.

This briefing follows last week’s announcement of a new Candidate Security Program, offering private, unarmed security details to protect political candidates from intimidation. It’s a telling sign of the times—when running for office in Canada now comes with real, documented threats from foreign powers.

And if you thought foreign interference was yesterday’s problem, what came next confirmed: it’s not just back—it’s more sophisticated, more aggressive, and more deeply embedded than ever.

The WeChat Election: CCP Bots, Mark Carney, and the Digital Hijacking of Canadian Democracy

The latest federal election security briefing confirmed what many suspected but few in government are willing to say out loud: the Chinese Communist Party is actively trying to shape Canadian politics—and their current project of interest is Mark Carney.

Intelligence services revealed that a state-linked WeChat account called Youli-Youmian, tied directly to the CCP’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, launched an information operation targeting Chinese-Canadian communities. The timing was not subtle. Two major spikes in activity occurred—on March 10 and again on March 25, right in the heart of the federal election campaign. The platform used was WeChat, a messaging app with over a billion users and a long record of CCP censorship, surveillance, and narrative control.

The operation focused on Mark Carney. He was the centerpiece. The content wasn’t one-sided, but it was manipulative. It praised him for being “tough” on the United States—exactly the kind of posture the CCP likes to see in Western leaders. At the same time, it seeded doubts about his experience and readiness to lead. The strategy is transparent: elevate the figure they believe will be most useful, then control the temperature of public perception around him.

The operation was not organic. Intelligence officials described it as “coordinated inauthentic behavior”—mass posting of identical headlines across outlets, bot-driven sharing, engineered engagement. This wasn’t a handful of users with strong opinions. It was algorithmic warfare.

The bureaucrats behind the briefing bent over backwards to downplay the impact. They said the campaign was “contained to one platform” and argued that Canadians have access to diverse information, so the overall electoral process remains “free and fair.” But that’s not the point. The CCP doesn’t need to control the entire media ecosystem. It only needs to shape perception where it counts—and in targeted communities, with targeted narratives, it’s clearly trying to do just that.

The Liberal Party was only briefed on the situation on April 6—after the second spike in activity. That’s weeks after the operation had already gained traction. What happened during that time? Carney’s campaign moved forward without addressing any of it. And now we know why. Whether he’s aware of it or not, the CCP sees value in propping him up—at least in the right communities, with the right messaging. If that doesn’t send alarm bells ringing, it should.

This isn’t speculation. It’s documented. It’s active. And it’s part of a larger pattern. The same interference networks have previously targeted Conservative MPs like Michael Chong, Erin O’Toole, and Kenny Chiu. They’ve gone after Chrystia Freeland too. But the recent attention to Carney marks something new—not just an attempt to tear down opponents, but to sculpt the image of a candidate who just might serve certain foreign interests, directly or indirectly.

The Chinese Communist Party doesn’t operate on party loyalty. It operates on leverage. And this operation—whether Carney asked for it or not—is a sign that Beijing believes his leadership could be shaped to their advantage.

The Canadian government can claim “no impact” all it wants. But influence isn’t always measured by votes—it’s measured by narrative, tone, and who ends up in the spotlight looking just a little more “strong” or “stable” through the right lens. Beijing’s lens.

The CCP’s Safe Bet: Mark Carney

And now, after days of playing cleanup behind a polished podium, the government rolls out a Q&A session to assure us that “nothing’s wrong,” “everything’s under control,” and that the CCP’s operation to shape the election isn’t a big deal because—get this—it only ran on one platform.

Let’s be blunt: the CCP isn’t playing to win headlines on Twitter. They’re not interested in going viral on Facebook. They’re targeting WeChat—because that’s where Chinese-Canadian voters live, talk, and form political opinions. And in that space, Beijing amplified Mark Carney—not because he’s “tough,” not because he’s competent, but because he’s good for China.

Canada has become a proxy battleground in a new Cold War between the West and the Chinese Communist Party. And Carney? He’s the CCP’s safe bet. Let’s not forget: this is the man whose financial career includes a quarter-billion-dollar loan from the Bank of China while chairing Brookfield Asset Management. The same man who’s never disclosed his full assets, despite now leading a party that’s still pretending foreign interference is just noise on the margins.

And now, in classic bureaucratic fashion, SITE and the government tell us they “don’t speculate on intent.” They claim the CCP is just sowing discord. That their approach is “party-agnostic.” That they weren’t trying to help Carney, just “pollute the digital environment.”

Give me a break. You don’t call someone a “tough opponent” to the U.S. and a “rock star” in a state-linked campaign unless you’re trying to boost their image. You don’t run coordinated bot amplification to spread content about one candidate because you’re bored and trying to “confuse people.” This wasn’t confusion. This was elevation.

And what did the government do? They flagged the content. They told Tencent about it. And then they backed off—because they don’t require any action. The PRC is running soft propaganda on a Canadian election platform, and Ottawa’s solution is: “Well, we told them. Hopefully they fix it.”

What’s worse? When asked about it directly, the government refused to name Carney as the beneficiary. They said they don’t want to “amplify the content” by repeating it. So let’s get this straight: Beijing gets to run a pro-Carney campaign, but Canadians aren’t even allowed to know the details?

That’s not protecting democracy. That’s protecting a narrative.

The truth is, Mark Carney is not being elevated because he’s good for Canadians. He’s being elevated because he’s safe for Beijing. The Liberals know it. The bureaucrats know it. And so far, no one in power has had the spine to stop it—because China’s interference benefits the very political class that claims to oppose it.

So when they talk about “safeguarding our democracy,” ask yourself: who are they really safeguarding it from? Because right now, it’s not from foreign influence—it’s from accountability.