From the Brownstone Institute

By Bruce W. Davidson 

The excessive medical response to the Covid pandemic made one thing abundantly clear: Medical consumers really ought to do their own research into the health issues that impact them. Furthermore, it is no longer enough simply to seek out a “second opinion” or even a “third opinion” from doctors. They may well all be misinformed or biased. Furthermore, this problem appears to predate the Covid phenomenon.

A striking example of that can be found in the recent history of prostate cancer testing and treatment, which, for personal reasons, has become a subject of interest to me. In many ways, it strongly resembles the Covid calamity, where misuse of the PCR test resulted in harming the supposedly Covid-infected with destructive treatments.

Two excellent books on the subject illuminate the issues involved in prostate cancer. One is Invasion of the Prostate Snatchers by Dr. Mark Scholz and Ralph Blum. Dr. Scholtz is executive director of the Prostate Cancer Research Institute in California. The other is The Great Prostate Hoax by Richard Ablin and Ronald Piana. Richard Ablin is a pathologist who invented the PSA test but has become a vociferous critic of its widespread use as a diagnostic tool for prostate cancer.

Mandatory yearly PSA testing at many institutions opened up a gold mine for urologists, who were able to perform lucrative biopsies and prostatectomies on patients who had PSA test numbers above a certain level. However, Ablin has insisted that “routine PSA screening does far more harm to men than good.” Moreover, he maintains that the medical people involved in prostate screening and treatment represent “a self-perpetuating industry that has maimed millions of American men.”

Even during approval hearings for the PSA test, the FDA was well aware of the problems and dangers. For one thing, the test has a 78% false positive rate. An elevated PSA level can be caused by various factors besides cancer, so it is not really a test for prostate cancer. Moreover, a PSA test score can spur frightened men into getting unnecessary biopsies and harmful surgical procedures.

One person who understood the potential dangers of the test well was the chairman of the FDA’s committee, Dr. Harold Markovitz, who decided whether to approve it. He declared, “I’m afraid of this test. If it is approved, it comes out with the imprimatur of the committee…as pointed out, you can’t wash your hands of guilt. . .all this does is threaten a whole lot of men with prostate biopsy…it’s dangerous.”

In the end, the committee did not give unqualified approval to the PSA test but only approved it “with conditions.” However, subsequently, the conditions were ignored.

Nevertheless, the PSA test became celebrated as the route to salvation from prostate cancer. The Postal Service even circulated a stamp promoting yearly PSA tests in 1999. Quite a few people became wealthy and well-known at the Hybritech company, thanks to the Tandem-R PSA test, their most lucrative product.

In those days, the corrupting influence of the pharmaceutical companies on the medical device and drug approval process was already apparent. In an editorial for the Journal of the American Medical Association (quoted in Albin and Piana’s book), Dr. Marcia Angell wrote, “The pharmaceutical industry has gained unprecedented control over the evaluation of its products…there’s mounting evidence that they skew the research they sponsor to make their drugs look better and safer.” She also authored the book The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It.

A cancer diagnosis often causes great anxiety, but in actuality, prostate cancer develops very slowly compared to other cancers and does not often pose an imminent threat to life. A chart featured in Scholz and Blum’s book compares the average length of life of people whose cancer returns after surgery. In the case of colon cancer, they live on average two more years, but prostate cancer patients live another 18.5 years.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, prostate cancer patients do not die from it but rather from something else, whether they are treated for it or not. In a 2023 article about this issue titled “To Treat or Not to Treat,” the author reports the results of a 15-year study of prostate cancer patients in the New England Journal of Medicine. Only 3% of the men in the study died of prostate cancer, and getting radiation or surgery for it did not seem to offer much statistical benefit over “active surveillance.”

Dr. Scholz confirms this, writing that “studies indicate that these treatments [radiation and surgery] reduce mortality in men with Low and Intermediate-Risk disease by only 1% to 2% and by less than 10% in men with High-Risk disease.”

Nowadays prostate surgery is a dangerous treatment choice, but it is still widely recommended by doctors, especially in Japan. Sadly, it also seems to be unnecessary. One study cited in Ablin and Piana’s book concluded that “PSA mass screening resulted in a huge increase in the number of radical prostatectomies. There is little evidence for improved survival outcomes in the recent years…”

However, a number of urologists urge their patients not to wait to get prostate surgery, threatening them with imminent death if they do not. Ralph Blum, a prostate cancer patient, was told by one urologist, “Without surgery you’ll be dead in two years.” Many will recall that similar death threats were also a common feature of Covid mRNA-injection promotion.

Weighing against prostate surgery are various risks, including death and long-term impairment, since it is a very difficult procedure, even with newer robotic technology. According to Dr. Scholz, about 1 in 600 prostate surgeries result in the death of the patient. Much higher percentages suffer from incontinence (15% to 20%) and impotence after surgery. The psychological impact of these side effects is not a minor problem for many men.

In light of the significant risks and little proven benefit of treatment, Dr. Scholz censures “the urology world’s persistent overtreatment mindset.” Clearly, excessive PSA screening led to inflicting unnecessary suffering on many men. More recently, the Covid phenomenon has been an even more dramatic case of medical overkill.

Ablin and Piana’s book makes an observation that also sheds a harsh light on the Covid medical response: “Isn’t cutting edge innovation that brings new medical technology to the market a good thing for health-care consumers? The answer is yes, but only if new technologies entering the market have proven benefit over the ones they replace.”

That last point especially applies to Japan right now, where people are being urged to receive the next-generation mRNA innovation–the self-amplifying mRNA Covid vaccine. Thankfully, a number seem to be resisting this time.

Justin Trudeau Describes For First Time His View of “PRC Targeting Paper” Held Back By His Advisor in 2023

For the first time, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has testified on his view of two explosive Canadian intelligence reports, including the “Targeting Paper,” which described how Chinese diplomats assessed Canadian MPs based on how helpful or hurtful they could be to Beijing. Trudeau confirmed that this report was not shared with him by his key security advisor, Jody Thomas.

Additionally, Trudeau addressed three memos starting in 2019 that intended to brief him on foreign interference threats, all of which he claimed never reached his desk, with the intended briefings for Parliamentarians, which he was requested to authorize, only occurring in June 2024.

The inquiry into foreign interference in Canada’s elections has uncovered deep, ongoing divisions between Trudeau’s top aides and Canada’s intelligence community, with particular focus on two pivotal reports: the CSIS Targeting Paper and the PCO January 2022 Special Report. These documents, which detail how Beijing has sought to influence Canadian politics, have become central to understanding how the government responded—or failed to respond—to the growing threat of interference.

The CSIS Targeting Paper, drafted in 2021 and circulated to a small number of public servants in 2023, “named names” and outlined how Chinese diplomats categorized Canadian parliamentarians into three groups: those friendly towards Beijing, those neutral or potentially persuadable, and those deemed antagonistic due to their criticism of China’s human rights record, particularly on issues like the Uyghurs and Hong Kong. During his testimony, Trudeau played down the significance of this report, arguing that such categorization is a normal part of diplomacy.

“What the targeting paper actually talks about is that China has broadly classified parliamentarians in their diplomatic activities—some as being positive towards China, others who are neutral or convincible, and others who have spoken out against China,” Trudeau said. He noted that this diplomatic behavior was not surprising or new to him, comparing it to Canada’s own tactics during the NAFTA negotiations with the Trump administration. “That’s just a part of diplomacy right there,” he claimed.

However, Trudeau acknowledged that despite some “interesting tidbits” in the report, his National Security Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) had decided not to pass it on to him in 2021, deeming it not significantly relevant to his understanding of China’s behavior. “I have faith, having looked at the paper, that it was indeed the right decision by the National Security Intelligence Advisor—that it wasn’t a document that significantly added in a relevant way to my understanding of the situation.”

The actual contents of this paper are unknown, and blocked from the Commission by Trudeau’s Attorney General.

The PCO January 2022 Special Report, reviewed by The Bureau, outlines an alarming situation. Based on over 100 CSIS reports, it detailed a covert network that implicated 11 Toronto-area candidates in the 2019 federal election in interference operations, involving clandestine fund transfers from the Toronto Chinese Consulate into proxy networks. This report stemmed from a sensitive investigation in the Greater Toronto Area, culminating in CSIS seeking a technical surveillance warrant in March 2021. The Special Report was flagged as highly sensitive and formed the backbone of the inquiry’s scrutiny of Chinese influence in Canadian elections.

Both of these reports became focal points in the inquiry, revealing deep disagreements between Trudeau’s political aides and intelligence officials. Katie Telford, Trudeau’s Chief of Staff, testified that Global Affairs Canada held a divergent view from CSIS, particularly regarding the scope of foreign interference threats. The inquiry has exposed a consistent reluctance within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to act on intelligence warnings, reflecting a broader divide between diplomacy and national security.

Three Memos and Delayed Briefings

In addition to the two reports, Trudeau faced questioning over three memos that called for him to authorize broad briefings on foreign interference risks and plans to brief Parliamentarians. Commission Counsel pressed him on why these memos, intended to reach him in 2019, 2020, and 2021, were not acted on.

“These decision points didn’t get to me,” Trudeau stated, acknowledging the breakdown. “But I made it very clear throughout conversations that I would have approved of, and encouraged, briefings.”

“Nobody flagged this was something of importance that was stalled, and therefore, as you pointed out, they weren’t acted on in my office,” Trudeau concluded.

As a result, Parliamentarians were not briefed on foreign interference threats until June 2024, years after the intelligence reports had first raised the alarm.

“Do you have any idea why no reply was given to all of those seeking authorization?” Commissioner Hogue asked.

“In the third case, it actually didn’t get to my office,” Trudeau said, while offering no explanation for the second, and pointing to COVID-19 in the first.

Trudeau’s testimony, which continues today, combined with that of senior aides such as Telford and Brian Clow, highlighted the troubling rifts between the PMO and Canada’s intelligence agencies. The intelligence community, led by CSIS, has consistently sounded the alarm about Chinese interference in Canadian politics, while the PMO and Global Affairs have often pushed back on CSIS’s assessments.

The inquiry has revealed that Global Affairs and the PMO tended to downplay foreign interference concerns, particularly those involving China, in favor of maintaining diplomatic and economic ties. This stance has been at odds with CSIS, which has taken a much more hawkish view, warning of serious threats to Canada’s democratic system.