Virtual care will break the Canada Health Act—and that’s a good thing

From the Fraser Institute

The leadership of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) is facing sharp criticism for its recent proposal to effectively ban private payment for virtual care. In a clear example of putting politics before patients, this would only erect additional barriers for those seeking care.

Moreover, it’s a desperate bid to cling to an outdated—and failed—model of health care while underestimating modern-day innovations.

Virtual care—online video doctor consultations—is a private-sector innovation. In response to our government system’s inability to provide timely care, private companies such as Maple have been offering these services to Canadians for almost a decade. In fact, the public system only pushed meaningfully into the virtual space during COVID when it established partnerships with these private companies alongside setting up new fee codes for virtual consultations.

In return for improving access to physician consultations for thousands of Canadians, these virtual care companies have been rewarded with increased government scrutiny and red tape. The weapon of choice? The Canada Health Act (CHA).

Specifically, sections 18 to 21 of the CHA prohibit user fees and extra billing for “medically necessary” services. Further, the insurance plan of a province must be publicly administered and provide “reasonable access” to 100 per cent of insured services. Provinces found in violation are punished by the federal government, which withholds a portion (or all) of federal health-care transfer payments.

Until recently, there had been no obvious conflict between the CHA and privately paid-for virtual care—primarily because the provinces are free to determine what’s medically necessary. Until recently, many provinces did not even have billing codes for virtual care. As virtual services are increasingly provided by the public sector, however, the ability to innovatively provide care for paying patients (either out-of-pocket or through private insurance) becomes restricted further.

Within this context, the CMA recently recommended formally including virtual care services within the public system, alongside measures to ensure “equitable access.” At the same time, it reiterated its recommendation that private insurance to access medically necessary services covered by the CHA be prohibited.

See where this is going?

The kicker is an additional recommendation banning dual practice (i.e. physicians working in both the public and private sector) except under certain conditions. This means doctors in the public system who could otherwise allocate their spare hours to private appointments online would now have to choose to operate exclusively in either the public or private system.

The combined effect of these policies would ensure that innovative private options for virtual care—whether paid for out-of-pocket or though private insurance—will either be overtaken by bureaucracies or disappear entirely.

But what the CMA report fails to recognize is that virtual care has expanded access to services the government fails to provide—there’s little reason to suspect a government takeover of the virtual-care sector will make things better for patients. And even if governments could somehow prevent Canadian doctors and companies providing these services privately, virtual care is not beholden to Canada’s physical borders. Patients with a little bit of technical knowhow will simply bypass the Canadian system entirely by having virtual consultations with doctors abroad. If Canadians can figure out how to access their favourite show in another country, you can be sure they’ll find a way to get a consultation with a doctor in Mumbai instead of Montreal.

Instead of forcing physicians and patients to operate within the crumbling confines of government-run health care, the CMA’s leadership should be grateful for the pressure valve that the private sector has produced. We should celebrate the private innovators who have provided Canadians better access to health care, not finding ways to shut them down in favour of more government control.

Author:

Bacchus Barua

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Carney government should privatize airports—then open airline industry to competition

Published on December 3, 2025

Todayville

From the Fraser Institute

By Alex Whalen and Jake Fuss

This holiday season, many Canadians will fly to spend time to with family and friends. But air travellers in Canada consistently report frustration with service, cost and choice. In its recent budget, the Carney government announced it will consider “options for the privatization of airports.” What does this mean for Canadians?

Up until the 1990s, the federal government served as both the owner and operator of Canada’s major airports. The Chrétien government partially privatized and transferred the operation of major airports to not-for-profit airport authorities, while the federal government remained the owner of the land. Since then, the federal government has effectively been the landlord for Canada’s airports, collecting rent each year from the not-for-profit operating authorities.

What would full privatization of airports look like?

If the government allows private for-profit businesses to own Canada’s major airports, their incentives would be to operate as efficiently as possible, serve customers and generate profits. Currently, there’s little incentive to compete as the operating authorities are largely unaccountable because they only report to government officials in a limited form, rather than reporting directly to shareholders as they would under privatization. Private for-profit airports exist in many other countries, and research has shown they are often less costly for passengers and more innovative.

Yet, privatization of airports should be only the first step in a broader package of reforms to improve air travel in Canada. The federal government should also open up competition by creating the conditions for new airports, new airlines and new investment. Currently, Canada restricts foreign ownership of Canadian airlines, while also restricting foreign airlines from flying within Canada. Consequently, Canadians are left with little choice when booking air travel. Opening up the industry by reversing these policies would force incumbent airlines to compete with a greater number of airlines, generating greater choice and likely lower costs for consumers.

Moreover, the federal government should reduce the taxes and fees on air travel that contribute to the cost of airline tickets. Indeed, according to our recent research, among peer countries, Canada has among the most expensive air travel taxes and fees. These costs get passed on to consumers, so it’s no surprise that Canada consistently ranks as a very expensive country for air travel.

If the Carney government actually privatizes Canada’s airports, this would be a good first step to introducing greater competition in an industry where it’s badly needed. But to truly deliver for Canadians, the government must go much further and overhaul the numerous policies, taxes and fees that limit competition and drive up costs.

Alex Whalen

Director, Atlantic Canada Prosperity, Fraser Institute

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Business

Ottawa’s gun ‘buyback’ program will cost billions—and for no good reason

Published on December 2, 2025

Todayville

From the Fraser Institute

By Gary Mauser

The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.

Five years after then-prime minister Justin Trudeau banned more than 100,000 types of so-called “assault-style firearms,” the federal government recently made the first attempt to force Canadians to surrender these firearms.

It didn’t go well.

The police chief in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, volunteered to run a pilot “buyback” project, which began last month. The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.

This failure should surprise no one. Back in 2018, a survey of “stakeholders” warned the government that firearms owners wouldn’t support such a gun ban. According to Prime Minister Carney’s own Privy Council Office the “program faces a risk of non-compliance.” And federal Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree was recently recorded admitting that the “buyback” is a partisan maneuver, and if it were up to him, he’d scrap it. What’s surprising is Ottawa’s persistence, particularly given the change in the government and the opportunity to discard ineffective policies.

So what’s really going on here?

One thing is for certain—this program is not, and never has been, about public safety. According to a report from the federal Department of Justice, almost all guns used in crimes in Canada, including in big cities such as Toronto, are possessed illegally by criminals, with many smuggled in from the United States. And according to Ontario’s solicitor general, more than 90 per cent of guns used in crimes in the province are illegally imported from the U.S. Obviously, the “buyback” program will have no effect on these guns possessed illegally by criminals.

Moreover, Canadian firearms owners are exceptionally law-abiding and less likely to commit murder than other Canadians. That also should not be surprising. To own a firearm in Canada, you must obtain a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) from the RCMP after initial vetting and daily monitoring for possible criminal activity. Between 2000 and 2020, an average of 12 PAL-holders per year were accused of homicide, out of approximately two million PAL-holders. During that same 10-year period, the PAL-holder firearms homicide rate was 0.63 (per 100,000 PAL-holders) compared to 0.72 (per 100,000 adult Canadians)—that’s 14 per cent higher than the rate for PAL-holders.

In other words, neither the so-called “assault-style firearms” nor their owners pose a threat to the public.

And the government’s own actions belie its claims. If these firearms are such a threat to Canadians, why slow-roll the “buyback” program? If inaction increased the likelihood of criminality by law-abiding firearms owners, why wait five years before launching a pilot program in a small community such as Cape Breton? And why continue to extend the amnesty period for another year, which the government did last month at the same time its pilot project netted a mere 22 firearms?

To ask those questions is to answer them.

Another question—how much will the “buyback” program cost taxpayers?

The government continues to block any attempt to disclose the full financial costs (although the Canadian Taxpayers Federation has launched a lawsuit to try to force the government to honour its Access to Information Act request). But back in 2020 the Trudeau government said it would cost $200 million to compensate firearms owners (although the Parliamentary Budget Officer said compensation costs could reach $756 million). By 2024, the program had spent $67.2 million—remember, that’s before it collected a single gun. The government recently said the program’s administrative costs (safe storage, destruction of hundreds of thousands of firearms, etc.) would reach an estimated $1.8 billion. And according to Carney’s first budget released in November, his government will spend $364 million on the program this fiscal year—at a time of massive federal deficits and debt.

This is reminiscent of the Chretien government’s gun registry fiasco, which wound up costing more than $2 billion even after then-justice minister Allan Rock promised the registry program would “almost break even” after an $85 million initial cost. The Harper government finally scrapped the registry in 2012.

As the Carney government clings to the policies of its predecessor, Canadians should understand the true nature of Ottawa’s gun “buyback” program and its costs.