Business
New York and Vermont Seek to Impose a Retroactive Climate Tax
From Heartland Daily News
By Joshua Loucks for the Cato Institute.
Energy producers will be subject to retroactive taxes in New York if the state assembly passes Senate Bill S2129A, known as the “Climate Change Superfund Act.” The superfund legislation seeks to impose a retroactive tax on energy companies that have emitted greenhouse gases (GHGs) and operated within the state over the last seventy years.
If passed, the new law will impose $75 billion in repayment fees for “historical polluters,” who lawmakers assert are primarily responsible for climate change damages within the state. The state will “assign liability to and require compensation from companies commensurate with their emissions” over the last “70 years or more.” The bill would establish a standard of strict liability, stating that “companies are required to pay into the fund because the use of their products caused the pollution. No finding of wrongdoing is required.”
New York is not alone in this effort. Superfunds built on retroactive taxes on GHG emissions are becoming increasingly popular. Vermont recently enacted similar legislation, S.259 (Act 122), titled the “Climate Superfund Act,” in which the state also retroactively taxes energy producers for historic emissions. Similar bills have also been introduced in Maryland and Massachusetts.
Climate superfund legislation seems to have one purpose: to raise revenue by taxing a politically unpopular industry. Under the New York law, fossil fuel‐producing energy companies would be taxed billions of dollars retroactively for engaging in legal and necessary behavior. For example, the seventy‐year retroactive tax would conceivably apply to any company—going back to 1954—that used fossil fuels to generate electricity or produced fuel for New York drivers.
The typical “economic efficiency” arguments for taxing an externality go out the window with the New York and Vermont approach, for at least two reasons. First, the goal of a blackboard or textbook approach to a carbon tax is to internalize the GHG externality. To apply such a tax accurately, the government would need to calculate the social cost of carbon (SCC).
Unfortunately, estimating the SCC is methodologically complex and open to wide ranges of estimates. As a result, the SCC is theoretically very useful but practically impossible to calculate with any reasonable degree of precision.
Second, the retroactive nature of these climate superfunds undermines the very incentives a textbook tax on externalities would promote. A carbon tax’s central feature is that it is intended to reduce externalities from current and future activity by changing incentives. However, by imposing retroactive taxes, the New York and Vermont legislation will not impact emitters’ future behavior in a way that mimics a textbook carbon tax or improves economic outcomes.
Arbitrary and retroactive taxes can, however, raise prices for consumers by increasing policy uncertainty, affecting firm profitability, and reducing investment (or causing investors to flee GHG‐emitting industries in the state altogether). Residents in both New York and Vermont already pay over 30 percent more than the US average in residential electricity prices, and this legislation will not lower these costs to consumers.
Climate superfunds are not a serious attempt to solve environmental challenges but rather a way to raise government revenue while unfairly punishing an entire industry (one whose actions the New York legislation claims “have been unconscionable, closely reflecting the strategy of denial, deflection, and delay used by the tobacco industry”).
Fossil fuel companies enabled GHG emissions, of course, but they also empowered significant growth, mobility, and prosperity. The punitive nature of the policy is laid bare by the fact that neither New York nor Vermont used a generic SCC or an evidentiary proceeding to calculate precise damages.
Finally, establishing a standard in which “no finding of wrongdoing is required” to levy fines against historical actions that were (and still are) legally permitted sets a dangerous precedent for what governments can do, not only to businesses that have produced fossil fuels but also to individuals who have consumed them.
Cato research associate Joshua Loucks contributed to this post.
Originally published by the Cato Institute. Republished with permission under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Business
Broken ‘equalization’ program bad for all provinces
From the Fraser Institute
By Alex Whalen and Tegan Hill
Back in the summer at a meeting in Halifax, several provincial premiers discussed a lawsuit meant to force the federal government to make changes to Canada’s equalization program. The suit—filed by Newfoundland and Labrador and backed by British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Alberta—effectively argues that the current formula isn’t fair. But while the question of “fairness” can be subjective, its clear the equalization program is broken.
In theory, the program equalizes the ability of provinces to deliver reasonably comparable services at a reasonably comparable level of taxation. Any province’s ability to pay is based on its “fiscal capacity”—that is, its ability to raise revenue.
This year, equalization payments will total a projected $25.3 billion with all provinces except B.C., Alberta and Saskatchewan to receive some money. Whether due to higher incomes, higher employment or other factors, these three provinces have a greater ability to collect government revenue so they will not receive equalization.
However, contrary to the intent of the program, as recently as 2021, equalization program costs increased despite a decline in the fiscal capacity of oil-producing provinces such as Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador. In other words, the fiscal capacity gap among provinces was shrinking, yet recipient provinces still received a larger equalization payment.
Why? Because a “fixed-growth rule,” introduced by the Harper government in 2009, ensures that payments grow roughly in line with the economy—even if the gap between richer and poorer provinces shrinks. The result? Total equalization payments (before adjusting for inflation) increased by 19 per cent between 2015/16 and 2020/21 despite the gap in fiscal capacities between provinces shrinking during this time.
Moreover, the structure of the equalization program is also causing problems, even for recipient provinces, because it generates strong disincentives to natural resource development and the resulting economic growth because the program “claws back” equalization dollars when provinces raise revenue from natural resource development. Despite some changes to reduce this problem, one study estimated that a recipient province wishing to increase its natural resource revenues by a modest 10 per cent could face up to a 97 per cent claw back in equalization payments.
Put simply, provinces that generally do not receive equalization such as Alberta, B.C. and Saskatchewan have been punished for developing their resources, whereas recipient provinces such as Quebec and in the Maritimes have been rewarded for not developing theirs.
Finally, the current program design also encourages recipient provinces to maintain high personal and business income tax rates. While higher tax rates can reduce the incentive to work, invest and be productive, they also raise the national standard average tax rate, which is used in the equalization allocation formula. Therefore, provinces are incentivized to maintain high and economically damaging tax rates to maximize equalization payments.
Unless premiers push for reforms that will improve economic incentives and contain program costs, all provinces—recipient and non-recipient—will suffer the consequences.
Authors:
Alberta
Alberta’s fiscal update projects budget surplus, but fiscal fortunes could quickly turn
From the Fraser Institute
By Tegan Hill
According to the recent mid-year update tabled Thursday, the Smith government projects a $4.6 billion surplus in 2024/25, up from the $2.9 billion surplus projected just a few months ago. Despite the good news, Premier Smith must reduce spending to avoid budget deficits.
The fiscal update projects resource revenue of $20.3 billion in 2024/25. Today’s relatively high—but very volatile—resource revenue (including oil and gas royalties) is helping finance today’s spending and maintain a balanced budget. But it will not last forever.
For perspective, in just the last decade the Alberta government’s annual resource revenue has been as low as $2.8 billion (2015/16) and as high as $25.2 billion (2022/23).
And while the resource revenue rollercoaster is currently in Alberta’s favor, Finance Minister Nate Horner acknowledges that “risks are on the rise” as oil prices have dropped considerably and forecasters are projecting downward pressure on prices—all of which impacts resource revenue.
In fact, the government’s own estimates show a $1 change in oil prices results in an estimated $630 million revenue swing. So while the Smith government plans to maintain a surplus in 2024/25, a small change in oil prices could quickly plunge Alberta back into deficit. Premier Smith has warned that her government may fall into a budget deficit this fiscal year.
This should come as no surprise. Alberta’s been on the resource revenue rollercoaster for decades. Successive governments have increased spending during the good times of high resource revenue, but failed to rein in spending when resource revenues fell.
Previous research has shown that, in Alberta, a $1 increase in resource revenue is associated with an estimated 56-cent increase in program spending the following fiscal year (on a per-person, inflation-adjusted basis). However, a decline in resource revenue is not similarly associated with a reduction in program spending. This pattern has led to historically high levels of government spending—and budget deficits—even in more recent years.
Consider this: If this fiscal year the Smith government received an average level of resource revenue (based on levels over the last 10 years), it would receive approximately $13,000 per Albertan. Yet the government plans to spend nearly $15,000 per Albertan this fiscal year (after adjusting for inflation). That’s a huge gap of roughly $2,000—and it means the government is continuing to take big risks with the provincial budget.
Of course, if the government falls back into deficit there are implications for everyday Albertans.
When the government runs a deficit, it accumulates debt, which Albertans must pay to service. In 2024/25, the government’s debt interest payments will cost each Albertan nearly $650. That’s largely because, despite running surpluses over the last few years, Albertans are still paying for debt accumulated during the most recent string of deficits from 2008/09 to 2020/21 (excluding 2014/15), which only ended when the government enjoyed an unexpected windfall in resource revenue in 2021/22.
According to Thursday’s mid-year fiscal update, Alberta’s finances continue to be at risk. To avoid deficits, the Smith government should meaningfully reduce spending so that it’s aligned with more reliable, stable levels of revenue.
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