espionage
Canada’s intelligence chief says he personally warned Trudeau about China’s election meddling
David Vigneault
From LifeSiteNews
Canadian Security Intelligence Service director David Vigneault authenticated memos used during private meetings with the prime minister as well as his staff concerning Chinese Communist deception.
The head of Canada’s intelligence agency testified under oath that he gave Justin Trudeau multiple warnings that agents of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) were going after Conservative MPs yet the prime minister has denied he ever got these warnings.
In what appears to be a contradiction of Trudeau’s claim that he was not briefed directly about CCP meddling in Canada’s electoral process, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director David Vigneault said late last week at the Foreign Interference Commission that he indeed had “communicated” the issues.
He then authenticated memos used during private meetings with Trudeau as well as his staff concerning CCP deception, which was also noted in a “top secret” memo titled Briefing to the Prime Minister’s Office on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Institutions, dated February 21, 2023.
The six-page memo went into full detail as to the extent of CCP subterfuge that targeted Canada’s Conservative Party in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.
The memo read that CCP agents “were almost certainly motivated by a perception the Conservative Party of Canada was promoting a platform that was perceived to be anti-China,” also stating that 2021 election anomalies were “aimed at discouraging Canadians, particularly of Chinese heritage, from supporting the Conservative Party, leader Erin O’Toole and particularly Steveston-Richmond East candidate Kenny Chiu.”
“We know the People’s Republic of China clandestinely and deceptively interfered in both the 2019 and 2021 general elections,” the memo reads.
Vigneault confirmed he used similar language when speaking with Trudeau and political aides.
At the Commission inquiry, Gib van Ert, counsel for Conservative MP Michael Chong, asked Vigneault if “this knowledge something you or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as a body communicated to the Prime Minister?”
“It is indeed something I communicated,” Vigneault replied.
Thomas Jarmyn, counsel for Erin O’Toole, then asked if “Those words were chosen with intention?”
“Yes, these words are carefully selected,” Vigneault replied.
Earlier this week, LifeSiteNews reported that details from the “top secret” memo have shown that Trudeau’s office was giving explicit warnings by Canadian intelligence that agents of the CCP were an “existential threat to Canadian democracy.”
The Foreign Interference Commission was convened to “examine and assess the interference by China, Russia, and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections (2019 and 2021 elections) at the national and electoral district levels.”
The Commission is being headed by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who had earlier said that she and her lawyers will remain “impartial” and will not be influenced by politics and began January 29.
In January, Hogue said that she would “uncover the truth whatever it may be.”
Spy head: Trudeau was ‘briefed’
Last week, the commission learned about another “secret” memo from October 26, 2022, about “clandestinely supported candidates” states that “People’s Republic of China officials could be emboldened in their electoral interference efforts by the 2021 defeat of former Richmond MP Kenny Chiu.”
During testimony at the commission, Vigneault confirmed that he mentioned the matter with Trudeau, saying, “This is one of the cases I briefed the Prime Minister on that day.”
Shantona Chaudhury, counsel for the commission, asked him if he was able to recall “whether that is something you conveyed to the Prime Minister?”
“I don’t remember if I used these exact words but talking about that specific case, I put that case in context in relation to other People’s Republic of China activities,” Vigneault replied.
Nando de Luca, counsel for the Conservative Party, then asked Vigneault if the information was specifically communicated to Trudeau.
“I can tell you some of that information was absolutely used to brief on a very specific topic,” Vigneault replied.
Vigneault then noted that all the top-secret memos, which were composed for his meetings with Trudeau’s office, contained many facts as well as similar language he had spoken of many times.
“I have verbalized some of these issues in the past,” Vigneault told the commission.
Despite the warnings given to Trudeau’s office, not once were opposition MPs warned that they were a target of CCP agents.
In May 2023, Trudeau said to reporters that he did not know anything about CCP agents targeting conservative MPs.
“The Canadian Security Intelligence Service knew about certain things but didn’t feel it reached a threshold that required them to pass it up out of CSIS,” he said.
“Was it briefed up out of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service? It was not,” he added, saying that “CSIS made the determination it wasn’t something that needed to be raised to a higher level because it wasn’t a significant enough concern.”
espionage
Breaking: CSIS warned Health Canada of “insider threat” from Wuhan Institute-tied scientist Dr. Qiu Seven Months Before Lethal Ebola Shipped to China
Sam Cooper
In an explosive admission, Parliament’s Canada-China Committee has confirmed that Canada’s spy agency, CSIS, issued a direct and unheeded warning to senior health officials in August 2018, raising concerns about “insider threat activities” linked to Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband, Keding Cheng.
This alert, delivered seven months before the couple’s network—with connections to the highest levels of Chinese biological weapons research—coordinated the shipment of live Ebola and Henipah virus samples from Canada’s high-security National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), highlighted risks posed by their continued access to sensitive materials.
“CSIS held a briefing for personnel responsible for security at [Public Health Canada],” in August 2018 that “focused on foreign interference and included possible indicators of insider threat activities, as well as other security risks,” according to CSIS’s submission to the Committee. In CSIS’s presentation, “student programs were identified as being one of these possible threat vectors,” prompting “[Public Health Canada] to flag two scientists to CSIS, Dr. Cheng and Dr. Qiu,” the Committee report, released Tuesday, states.
Despite these explicit warnings, no immediate restrictions were placed on Qiu, Cheng, or their Chinese students’ access to Canada’s sensitive research materials. In December 2018, Public Health Canada authorized a fact-finding investigation into the concerns, but the delayed response effectively allowed them to continue their operations, further endangering Canada’s security.
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The Committee report also finds—like the ongoing Hogue Commission—that Justin Trudeau’s government, including senior bureaucrats and ministers, showed a reluctance to act on or even acknowledge urgent alerts from CSIS, exposing a stark divide between CSIS’s view of Chinese threats and Trudeau’s.
Dr. Qiu’s associations with China’s military and scientific programs had deep roots. She began her work at the Winnipeg NML in 2003, followed by her husband’s employment there in 2006.
As early as 2013, Keding Cheng filled out an application for the PRC’s “Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province,” requiring applicants to “passionately love the socialist motherland [PRC]” and maintain Chinese citizenship.
By 2016, Dr. Qiu was nominated for an award by a senior military official from the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences, recognizing her collaborations with Major-General Chen Wei, a leading figure in China’s biological weapons research. CSIS investigations revealed that Dr. Qiu and Major-General Chen collaborated on multiple research projects dating back to 2012.
Dr. Qiu’s use of Canada’s facilities to benefit China was well recognized in Beijing. An award nomination for Dr. Qiu noted that she “used Canada’s Level 4 Biosecurity Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly pathogenic pathogens … and achieved brilliant results.”
In October 2016, Dr. Qiu co-authored a paper with Major-General Chen and other scientists affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences, further deepening her connection to Chinese military research. By this time, Qiu had also been recruited into China’s Thousand Talents Program—a PRC initiative aimed at harnessing international scientific expertise—and these affiliations, conspicuously absent from her Canadian curriculum vitae, made her a person of interest to CSIS, especially as her work increasingly intersected with China’s biosecurity research.
Concerns over Qiu and Cheng’s activities continued to mount at the NML. In October 2018, Cheng, accompanied by a restricted visitor, attempted to exit the lab with two Styrofoam containers, claiming they were empty. By January 2019, Cheng breached security again by using another employee’s passcode to enter the NML.
On March 23, 2019, Public Health Canada received its fact-finding report, which advised administrative investigations into Qiu and Cheng. Yet, only days later, on March 31, live samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses were shipped from the NML to the WIV, highlighting critical lapses in Canada’s security protocols.
In response to these revelations, the Committee’s report outlines recommendations to safeguard Canada’s scientific resources from similar threats in the future. Chief among these is a call for the Government of Canada to immediately terminate all research collaboration with PRC-affiliated entities in sensitive fields, such as artificial intelligence, aerospace, and advanced digital infrastructure.
A key recommendation is to designate the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Thousand Talents Program as Named Research Organizations under Public Safety Canada, subjecting them to enhanced scrutiny and restricted partnerships due to their potential security risks. Furthermore, the Committee suggests that Canada explore constitutionally compliant legal measures to prevent individuals under national security investigation from leaving the country. Despite RCMP investigations, the couple was able to leave Canada.
As investigations mounted, irregularities in the WIV shipment were noticed, and it was only in January 2021 that Public Health Canada terminated the couple’s employment. Nathalie Drouin, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, acknowledged with evident understatement, “it is a timeline that needs to be looked at.” However, Richard Fadden, the director of CSIS from 2009 to 2013, testified that the timeline “was too long” and the viral shipment to WIV “should not have happened.”
In his opinion, the incident at the Winnipeg NML revealed a deep cultural issue long present in Canada’s federal administration. “I don’t think the culture in this particular lab and in large parts of the public service had caught up with the change in facts as we understand China,” Fadden said. His comments emphasize a notable gap between CSIS’s understanding of the Chinese threat and that of Trudeau’s administration.
“This gap in the understanding of risk between national security and science sectors at the federal level, particularly with regard to the threat to Canadian interests posed by actions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was illustrated in testimony before the Special Committee,” the report says.
On one hand, Minister of Health Mark Holland noted that “countries such as China are implicating themselves in our domestic processes in a way that would have been unimaginable just five years ago” and are “potentially willing, in this instance, to use pathogens that threaten humanity in order to advance their geopolitical agenda.” But Fadden pointed out that “CSIS was already aware of concerns about the PRC’s actions,” noting that since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2013, the institutionalization of espionage and interference techniques by the CCP has intensified.
Adding to these concerns is the Trudeau government’s controversial denial of access to related records, noted by the report, raising questions of transparency and whether there may have been a cover-up of key details surrounding the case.
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espionage
Release the names! Foreign interference scandal reaching boiling point in shocking press conference
Independent MP, Investigative Reporter, Former CSIS Asia-Pacific Desk Chief shed new light on foreign interference
Press conference is hosted by (Former Liberal) Independent MP Kevin Vuong:
- MP Kevin Vuong;
- Sam Cooper, Investigative Journalist;
- Dr. Carles Burton, Senior Fellow Sinopsis;
- Michel Juneau-Katsua, Former CSIS Asia-Pacific Desk Chief.
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