Biden chose Venezuela over Canada for oil

From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Brian Lee Crowley

Biden is welcoming oil from one of Latin America’s most odious regimes. It’s a big win for Nicolás Maduro, but a bad deal for America and Canada

The United States needs more heavy oil for a whole series of reasons. President Joe Biden could have chosen to have that oil come from a close friend and ally, environmentally-conscious Canada, or from one of the world’s nastiest regimes, Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela, which doesn’t give a toss about the environment. Which did he choose?

Venezuela, of course.

In exchange for modest concessions on electoral reform, the Biden administration just lifted sanctions on Venezuela, allowing them to export hundreds of thousands of barrels a day of vital heavy oil to the United States. The shale oil revolution has not and cannot change the fact that the US produces virtually no heavy oil, yet many of this country’s refineries, especially on the Gulf Coast, were set up to refine that kind of oil. Most of their heavy oil is from Canada, which is why that country is far and away the largest exporter of oil to America— more than twice as much as Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Russia, and Colombia combined. If America is now a net exporter of oil, it can thank Canada.

The war in Ukraine caused unpopular price hikes at the gas pump. In response, the Biden administration has drawn down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). That drawdown focused on medium and heavy crudes. OPEC responded with supply cuts aimed at throttling the supply of these strategically important crudes.

The drawdown of the SPR is reaching its limits but the risk of higher gas prices in an election year is rising. To OPEC and Ukraine, we must now add the heightened risk of conflict spreading in the Middle East.

In this context, recall that one of the very first acts President Biden took on reaching office was to cancel the permit for the Keystone XL (KXL) pipeline, a permit issued by his predecessor. Keystone XL was intended to provide 830,000 barrels a day of Canadian heavy crude to those Gulf Coast refineries. Pipe was already being laid.

Had President Biden allowed KXL to proceed, the supply of heavy oil to the US industry would have been secure, risky drawdowns of the SPR unnecessary and America would have been much less vulnerable to global supply disruptions and OPEC’s manipulations.

Instead, the President colluded with a campaign to vilify oil from Alberta’s oilsands as “dirty oil.” Yes, producing Canada’s heavy oil emits greenhouse gases. But then all heavy oil is GHG intensive, and Venezuela is the highest emitting in the world.

The Canadian oil & gas sector has invested heavily and successfully in emissions reductions. The industry has a $75 billion plan to decarbonize and achieve net zero by 2050, focused on carbon capture and storage and small modular nuclear reactors.

Venezuela has done nada in terms of real improvement in the environmental footprint of its heavy oil production. What it does have is a regime that is world-leading in terms of its human rights abuses and the damage it has inflicted on a once-prosperous economy. Every dollar America spends on Venezuelan oil will prop up one of the most violent and repressive regimes in the Americas, where Amnesty International says in 2022:

The security forces responded with excessive force and other repressive measures to protests…to demand economic and social rights, including the right to water. Impunity for ongoing extrajudicial executions by the security forces persisted. Intelligence services and other security forces, with the acquiescence of the judicial system, continued to arbitrarily detain, torture, and otherwise ill-treat those perceived to be opponents of the government of Nicolás Maduro.

A recent UN Fact Finding Mission to Venezuela talked about the “unremitting human rights crisis” and patterns of crimes against humanity in that country. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans are estimated to have fled the economic and humanitarian crisis there.

Meanwhile, Canada, while not perfect, has robust human rights protections and high environmental standards. It is also a magnet for immigrants (including tens of thousands of Venezuelans), having one of the highest shares of its population born elsewhere in any country in the world.

In 2021 President Biden was happy to offend one of America’s closest allies by blocking KXL because it was inconsistent “with my administration’s economic and climate imperatives.” Three short years later, behind the fig leaf of Venezuelan electoral reform, he is welcoming much more environmentally damaging oil from one of Latin America’s most odious regimes, all to try and keep the price down at the pump. That’s a big win for Nicolás Maduro, but a bad deal for America and Canada.

Brian Lee Crowley is the Managing Director of the Center for North American Prosperity and Security (www.cnaps.org).

Related Topics:#BrianLeeCrowley #MacdonaldLaurierInstitute feature

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Energy

Why Japan wants Western Canadian LNG

Published on December 31, 2025

Todayville

From Resource Works

By Ian Biana

In a Dec. 22, 2025 article, influential Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun laid out why Japan is placing growing strategic weight on liquefied natural gas exports from Western Canada – and why the start of full-scale operations at LNG Canada marks a significant shift in Japan’s energy-security calculus.

The article, written by staff writer Shiki Iwasawa, approaches Canadian LNG not as a climate story or an industrial milestone, but as a response to the vulnerabilities Japan has experienced since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended global gas markets.

1. Shorter distance and faster delivery

The most immediate advantage identified is geography. LNG shipped from British Columbia’s Pacific coast reaches Japan in about 10 days, roughly half the time required for cargoes originating in the Middle East or the U.S. Southeast, which can take 16 to 30 days.

For Japan – the world’s largest LNG importer – shorter voyages mean lower transportation costs, tighter inventory management, and reduced exposure to disruptions while cargoes are at sea.

2. Avoidance of global maritime choke points

Just as important, Canadian LNG avoids the world’s most precarious shipping bottlenecks.

The Asahi report emphasizes that shipments from B.C. do not pass through either:

the Strait of Hormuz, increasingly volatile amid Middle East conflict, or
the Panama Canal, where climate-driven water shortages have already led to passage restrictions.

Japanese officials explicitly frame these routes as strategic liabilities. As one senior government official responsible for energy security told the newspaper: “We, the government, have high hopes. It means a lot not having to go through the choke points.”

From Japan’s perspective, Canada’s Pacific-facing terminals offer a rare combination of proximity and route resilience.

3. Political reliability and allied status

The article contrasts Canada sharply with Russia, once a significant LNG supplier to Japan through the Sakhalin-2 project.

Before the Ukraine war, Russia accounted for about 10 per cent of Japan’s LNG imports. When Japan joined international sanctions, Moscow responded by restructuring the project’s ownership – a move that underscored how energy supplies can be weaponized.

A government source reflected on that experience bluntly: “We had thought it would be OK if we diversified procurement sources, but we were at risk of power outages even if only 10 percent (of LNG) didn’t reach Japan.”

Canada, by contrast, is described as a friendly and politically stable nation, free from sanctions risk and viewed as a long-term, rules-based partner.

4. Scale, certainty, and investment momentum

The Asahi article devotes considerable attention to the fundamentals of LNG Canada itself.

Key features highlighted include:

approximately $14 billion in total development costs,
14 million tonnes per year of production capacity,
two liquefaction trains already operating,
natural gas sourced from inland Canada and transported via a 670-kilometre pipeline to the coast,
and the successful shipment of first cargoes in mid-2025.

Mitsubishi Corp., which holds a 15 per cent stake, has rights to market 2.1 million tonnes annually to Japan and other Asian buyers. Mitsubishi expects the project to generate tens of billions of yen in annual profits starting in the fiscal year beginning April 2026.

At a Nov. 4 news conference, Mitsubishi president Katsuya Nakanishi said the company is actively considering additional investment to expand capacity, with internal sources indicating output could eventually double.

5. LNG’s continuing role in Japan’s energy system

The article situates Canadian LNG within Japan’s broader energy strategy. Under Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Law, LNG is designated a “specified critical product.” The government maintains dedicated funds to secure supply during emergencies.

While nuclear power remains central to long-term planning, officials acknowledge LNG’s indispensable role. A senior economy ministry official told Asahi: “Nuclear power is the key player in the spotlight, but thermal power (mainly fueled by LNG) is the key player behind the scenes.”

Japan’s latest Basic Energy Plan projects LNG imports rising to 74 million tonnes by 2040, roughly 10 per cent higher than today, underscoring why secure, politically insulated suppliers matter.

What Japan’s view tells Canada

In a recent Canada-Japan leaders’ meeting on the sidelines of APEC, Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi discussed expanding economic ties, with energy cooperation specifically highlighted around the LNG Canada project as a key element of their bilateral relationship. While Takaichi didn’t make a detailed public statement about Canadian LNG itself, the joint statement underscored Japan’s interest in stable and diversified LNG supplies—of which Canadian exports are a part of the broader Indo-Pacific energy security context.

What emerges from Asahi Shimbun’s reporting is a pragmatic assessment shaped by recent shocks. Japan values Canadian LNG because it is closer, less exposed to conflict-prone routes, backed by a stable political system, and already delivering cargoes at scale.

For Canadian readers, the message is unambiguous: Western Canadian LNG is not being embraced because of rhetoric or aspiration, but because it aligns with the operational, geopolitical, and economic priorities of one of the world’s most energy-dependent nations.

Energy

Canada’s debate on energy levelled up in 2025

Published on December 30, 2025

Todayville

From Resource Works

By Geoff Russ

Compared to last December, Canadians are paying far more attention.

Canada’s energy conversation has changed in a year, not by becoming gentler, but by becoming real. In late 2024, pipelines were still treated as symbols, and most people tuned out. By December 2025, Canadians are arguing about tolls, tariffs, tanker law, carbon pricing, and Indigenous equity in the same breath, because those details now ultimately decide what gets built and what stays in the binder. Prime Minister Mark Carney has gone from a green bureaucrat to an ostensible backer of another pipeline from Alberta to the West Coast.

From hypothetical to live instrument

The pivot began when the Trans Mountain expansion started operating in May 2024, tripling capacity from Alberta to the B.C. coast. The project’s C$34 billion price tag, and the question of who absorbs the overrun, forced a more adult debate than the old slogans ever allowed. With more barrels moving and new Asian cargoes becoming routine, the line stopped being hypothetical and became a live economic instrument, complete with uncomfortable arithmetic about costs, revenues, and taxpayer exposure.

The American election cycle then poured gasoline on the discussion. Talk in Washington about resurrecting Keystone XL, alongside President-elect Donald Trump’s threats of 25 percent tariffs, reminded Canadians how quickly market access can be turned into leverage.

In that context, Trans Mountain is being discussed not just as infrastructure, but as an emergency outlet if U.S. refiners start pricing in new levies.

The world keeps building

Against that backdrop, the world kept building. Global pipeline planning has not paused for Canadian anxieties, with more than 233,000 kilometres of large diameter oil and gas lines announced or advancing for 2024 to 2030. The claim that blocking Canadian projects keeps fossil fuels in the ground sounds thinner when other jurisdictions are plainly racing ahead.

The biggest shift, though, is domestic. Ottawa and Alberta signed a memorandum of understanding in late November 2025 that sketches conditions for a potential new oil pipeline to the West Coast, alongside a strengthened industrial carbon price and a Pathways Alliance carbon capture requirement. One Financial Post column argued the northwest coast fight may be a diversion, because cheaper capacity additions are on the table. Another argued the MOU is effectively a set of investment killers, because tanker ban changes, Indigenous co ownership, B.C. engagement, and CCUS preconditions create multiple points of failure.

This is where Margareta Dovgal deserves credit. Writing about the Commons vote where Conservatives tabled a motion echoing the Liberals’ own MOU language, she captured the new mood. Canadians are no longer impressed by politicians who talk like builders and vote like blockers. Symbolic yeses and procedural noes are now obvious, and voters are keeping score.

Skills for a new era

The same sharper attention is landing on carbon capture, once a technocratic sidebar. Under the MOU, a new bitumen corridor is tied to Pathways Alliance scale carbon management, and that linkage is already shaping labour planning. A Calgary based training initiative backed by federal funding aims to prepare more than 1,000 workers for carbon capture and storage roles, a sign that contested policy is producing concrete demand for skills.

British Columbia is no longer watching from the bleachers. It flared again at Carney’s December 18 virtual meeting, after Environment Minister Steven Guilbeault resigned from cabinet over it. Premier David Eby has attacked the Alberta Ottawa agreement as unacceptable, and Prime Minister Mark Carney has been forced into talks with premiers amid trade uncertainty. Polling suggests the public mood is shifting, too, with a slim majority of Canadians, and of British Columbians, saying they would support a new Alberta to West Coast pipeline even if the B.C. government opposed it, and similar support for lifting the tanker ban.

None of this guarantees a new line, or even an expanded one. But compared with last year’s tired trench warfare, the argument now has stakes, participants, and facts. Canadians have woken up to the reality that energy policy is not a culture war accessory. It is industrial policy, trade policy, and national unity policy, all at once.

Resource Works News